Shrapnel Games Blog

One of the problems wargame designers face is the fact that history isn’t balanced. There have been few moments in the history of human conflict when both sides ran equal when it came to force composition, position, and willpower. The challenge then is to take history and turn it into a game (mind you, not a simulation, which does allow for imbalance) that is somewhat balanced for playability’s sake.

Typically as the design widens the more difficult the balancing act becomes. At the tactical level it’s rather easy to essentially ignore history beyond making sure the right unit is in the right place, but at the grand strategic level your design must accurately represent what the belligerents faced. For example, a strategic game on the Vietnam conflict with absolutely no consideration for the politics of the era would fail as a game. Likewise, an American Civil War game that doesn’t take into account the 1864 election would be lacking.

The war in the Pacific is one of those tough acts for designers. Historically a Japanese victory was almost impossible. If you want to go all Turtledove possibly a quick victory in China would have helped (thus freeing the massive number of Jap forces there to strike into India). And perhaps if the US carriers were at Pearl—and if the oil storage was devastated—that could have set the US back another six or so months and the IJN could have ruled the Pacific unchecked for a longer period. In the end though it still would simply equal a delay, assuming the war in Europe went about the same.

So, when faced with a war that for one side is pretty much a losing proposition, how do you make it winnable but still ensure that it’s within the realms of possibility? I was curious how John Hawkins, the designer for the upcoming War Plan Pacific (in case you missed the news here’s the release) was tackling the problem, especially since he’s aiming for a fast playing treatment, so I asked him.

Each side has two ways to win (one quick, one slow), and two ways to lose (one quick, and one slow). Japanese victory depends on prolonging the war to the point that the American public would decide the cost of revenge for Pearl Harbor (and other things) wasn’t worth it. I’m not really sure that was even possible for the Japanese – one of my aunts was a young girl in 1941, and bitterly hated the Japanese for the rest of her days. A good friend of the family’s husband was a Marine photographer in New Guinea and the Philippines. She gave me some of his old photos (most he took were government property, but he came home with a few personal ones – mostly Papuan women in, um, “native dress”) but one was from the Philippines, and it was a billboard erected along part of the path of the Bataan Death March. It told passing soldiers what the Japanese did along that road, and ended with three foot high letters saying “Kill the Bastards.” I think Churchill was right, the Japanese were doomed to be “ground to powder”, but for purposes of the game, I’ll let Japan win or lose based on the assumptions Japanese leadership made at the time, that the American public would eventually demand peace.

There are two parts of the game that can be considered “blockades” of a sort. One, if the Allies control Luzon, Leyte or Formosa, they will interdict oil flowing from the DEI into Japan. Running out of oil is one way for Japan to lose (being bombed into oblivion is the other). The second place that the blockade (and specifically the US Submarine effort) comes into play is the Sea Lanes victory condition. If Japan can cut the sea lanes to Australia, the allies lose the forward bases in Oz, which were particularly important for the sub war, and it’s assumed that losing these bases would prolong the war to the point where Japan could get a peace treaty recognizing her conquests. Of course, understanding all that isn’t essential for someone who just wants to play the game, and to fit the design constraints I had to make many abstractions, but I tried to keep a historical basis for the decisions I made.

It was good to see the Japanese oil problem in the game. For the IJN player his oil score must always be kept above zero. If at any time it drops to zero or below, game over. Currently the oil score is computed as follows (bear in mind that as the game undergoes more testing this can change):

At the start the Japanese player has 4 oil points. Each turn (which by the way represents a month) one point is subtracted, but at the same time one point is added for each of the following bases controlled by Japan: Borneo, Java, and Singapore. This can be countered by the Allies controlling Leyte, Luzon, and Formosa.

John on the way he came up with this mechanic:

By setting the initial Oil reserves rather low, it puts immense pressure on the Japanese player to secure those islands, encouraging him to invest historically massive forces in the effort. This keeps a Japanese player from cavalierly attempting a zerg-rush against the Hawaiian Islands or the US-Australian sea lanes. With the impact that the Philippines have on oil flow, the Japanese are likely to be kept busy for a while in the region, giving the Allied player some chance at mounting an early defense.

As a side note another light PTO game that does a good job with the oil crunch is the board game Fire In The Sky, published by MMP. Currently out-of-print, if you can snag a copy do so.

John’s handling of the strategic air war (another side note, who else is also excited by Khyber Pass’ B-29 Superfortress?), much like the way oil works, is also a nice exercise in simplicity. Once B-29s become historically available (October ’43 turn) for each base the Allies control within bombing range of the home islands gives the Allied player one Strategic Bombing point. Accumulate twenty-five and Japan is forced to surrender, abstractly representing the atomic bombings.

There are also two other victory conditions. The Japanese player can force the Allies to lose by simply holding off and surviving into 1946. Obviously the key is they need to not only keep at least one oil point flowing, but also make sure the can survive the bombing campaign for that long. Another method is to isolate Australia for six months, thus denying the Americans their forward bases and material support to the land down under.

These are all sounding like great mechanics, that both fulfill reality but also make for interesting play decisions. For both players they will be faced with key decisions on what to protect, and what to go after, often directly at odds with their opponent.

Stay tuned for an interview with John Hawkins in this month’s Frag! newsletter.